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The Cowboy and the Cop: The Saga of




Americans have had a longstanding traditional right to anonymity.
The anonymous pamphleteer, for example, in addition to being a part of
folklore, is engaged in a constitutionally protected activity.1 The right to
wander aimlessly in the nighttime is also constitutionally protected.2
And, prior to June 21, 2004, the Supreme Court had never so much as
hinted that the state could punish a person for refusal to identify himself
in the absence of probable cause to arrest.3 In Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial
Court,4 however, the Court held that a rural rancher/cowboy, lawfully
parked by the side of the road, could be deemed a criminal simply for
refusing to identify himself to a police officer, notwithstanding that he
was guilty of no other crime.
In this essay, I shall explore how we came to reach such a legal
climate; and, in the course thereof, ultimately focus on whether Dudley
Hiibel was a victim of 9/11. And, if he was, are we all less free because
of it? I will begin this essay by examining the circumstances
surrounding Mr. Hiibel's confrontation with the Nevada police. Next, I
will suggest a hypothetical dissenting opinion that should have been
written in this case. Then, I will discuss the potential ramifications of the
case on the citizenry. Finally, I will conclude with Dudley Hiibel's
poignant comments about his case, which, I regret to say, were more
* Graham Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.
The author would like to thank the participants at the criminal procedure workshop and
the dedicated research assistance of William Cross.
1. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Talley v.
California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
2. See Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
3. Even then, it is not clear that one could be punished for failure to identify
himself, but Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990), certainly suggests as much.
4. 124 S.Ct. 2451 (2004).
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prescient than those of the five Justices that voted to uphold his
conviction.
II. What Happened
For Deputy Sheriff Lee Dove, the encounter began with a phone call
from a known and reliable source. A man identified as Mr. Riddley had
called to tell the police that he had seen a man and woman driving in a
red and silver GM pickup truck on Grass Valley Road. The couple had
been arguing, and the man, who was wearing a black cowboy hat, had hit
the woman. Deputy Dove drove to the scene and spoke to Mr. Riddley,
who confirmed his report. Deputy Dove then followed Grass Valley
Road and saw a red and silver GM pickup truck parked by the side of the
road. A woman was sitting in the passenger seat, and a man wearing a
black cowboy hat was standing by the passenger side door smoking a
cigarette. Deputy Dove stepped out of his car to investigate.
As far as Dudley Hiibel knew, the officer striding towards him was
on routine patrol, perhaps concerned that his truck was parked too
closely to the road. At the same time that Deputy Dove had been talking
to Mr. Riddley, Hiibel and his daughter had been driving down the road
arguing about a boy in town. Mr. Hiibel didn't like the boy, but his
daughter Mimi had been seeing him against her father's wishes. Tempers
were high and at one point Mimi, while driving the truck, struck her
father on the shoulder out of frustration. Hiibel asked his daughter to
pull the truck over. Once they were parked, he got out and lit up a
cigarette to calm his nerves. He began speaking to his daughter again,
when they were interrupted by the wail of a police siren. Unaware of the
officer's purpose, and still concerned about his daughter in the truck,
Dudley Hiibel cautiously greeted the officer walking towards him.
Fortunately, Deputy Dove's squad car was equipped with a video
camera that captured the confrontation between Hiibel and Dove, and
recorded Hiibel's ultimate arrest. Because of the great importance of
understanding exactly what happened on the fateful day, I am
reproducing the entire transcript. At several points the conversation
became garbled, and in the interest of strict accuracy and maintaining the
flow of the transcript, those garbled parts of the conversation have been
included and indicated either with a blank space or a dotted line.
Hiibel: How's it goin' Sheriff
Dove: How ya doin'?
5. The video itself, as well as the transcript that follows, is available at
http://papersplease.org/hiibel/video.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2005).
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D ove: W ell ....................
H: Looks like I'm parked ok
D: Well, I've got a report that there's been a fightin' going on
between you two tonight.
H: I don't know nuttin' about that. - Of course, I've
D: Why don't you come over here, ok?
H: I'm parked alright on the side of the road
D: You've got any identification on you?
H: No, why should I have an ID? Why do you want
me to...
D: The thing is this - we're doin' an investigation, ok and I
wanna see some identification
H: Naw, I'm - gonna -
D: I need to see some identification
H: I don't, I don't think, I think I've
D: Come over here. Sir...
H: Sir, don't grab onto me
D: I won't grab you if you'll come back over here
H: - sorry
D: Come back over here, ok
H: Why in hell do I go over here? Why? Am I under arrest?
D: I just need to see some identification.
H: Why?
2005]
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D: Because I'm investigating an investigation
H: Investigating what?
D: I'm investigating
H: I'm a legal
D:
H: I'm illegally parked, I mean, I mean I am illegally parked?
D: How'd you get home yesterday
H: That don't matter
D:
H:
D: It could be a searchable situation
H: Ok, take me to jail.
D: I didn't say that
H: Alright then I'm not illegally parked
D: ok
H: I know what, I know what I'm talking to
D:
H: I know what you - type
D: registration
H: Why?
D: Because I wanna find out who you are and I wanna find out what
I've got going on here
THE COWBOY AND THE COP
H:




D: Show me your identification....
H: Why?
D: and uh, uh fine. Show me your identification.
H: I'm uh, I'm uh, I'm being cooperative with you. I'm...
D: Show me your ID
H: I'm, I'm cooperating with you
D: Show me your ID
H: If you've got something take me to jail




D: ... and then we'll talk, ok?
H: I don't want to talk. I've done nothing.' I've broken no laws.
Take me to jail, I don't care.
D: Why would I, why would I take you to jail if you've broken no
laws?
H: Because you wanna apparently. I'm not illegally parked, I'm not
2005]
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doin' nothing.' I've got a guy behind me who wants to take me to
jail.







H: I don't care
D: You're not going to cooperate?
H: Because I...
D: So then you're not gonna cooperate with me at all? Ok, turn
around and put your hands on your back. Spread your feet.
Mimi: Nooo more!
D: Spread your feet, spread your feet,
M: No more!
D: Spread your feet wider, thank you sir.
M: Aaaahhhh
D: Ok, I'm going to tilt you back in a second. Do you got any
- or stick that will hurt me?
H: I...
D: I'm gonna take your knife and you'll get it back at a later time,
now.
[Vol. 109:4
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M: Aaahhhhh! Get off of me! Get offofme!
H: Big man, big man, real big man!
Radio:
M: Aaahhh!
H: Big man, gee what a big man!
M: Stop!
H: I can't, I've never seen such a big man since you guys.
M: Get off of me! Get off of me!
M: Get off of me!




M: Why are you doing this to me?
H: Big men, big men.
M: (expletive)
D: (to Mimi) Can you explain to me what happened tonight?
20051
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M: I told you. We got in a fight ( ......... ) and I told ya what we
we were arguing about because we were fightin.'
D: You feel like standin' up?
M: I feel like you getting this thing off of me
D: Can I help you stand up so then we can talk? Maybe we can take
those off.
M: Come on...
D: Wanna stand up?
D: What's you're name?
H: Big man





Faced with the specter of a routine investigation gone wrong
because a recalcitrant suspect refused to provide his papers to a
belligerent officer, one might have expected the Supreme Court to give
careful consideration to the factual nuances of the case. Unfortunately,
that was not to be. Justice Kennedy, for a 5-4 majority, focused only on
Hiibel's refusal to provide identification, evidently believing that Dove's
refusal to answer Hiibel's questions was immaterial to the case.
III. Hypothetical Dissenting Opinion
7
A
The Court holds: "[A]n officer may not arrest a suspect for failure
6. Video Tape Transcript, at http://papersplease.org/hiibel/video.html (last visited
Feb. 15, 2005) (the transcript has been reproduced in this essay exactly as it appears on
the website).
7. Both Justices Stevens and Breyer wrote dissenting opinions. Neither, to my
mind, captures the magnitude of the harm done by the Court.
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to identify himself if the identification request is not reasonably related
to the circumstances justifying the stop."' 8 I agree. The Court goes on to
hold: "It is clear in this case that the request for identification was
'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified' the
stop."9  It is difficult to believe that the Court finds clarity for its
conclusion in the transcript-that I read and watched on videotape, but it
must because that is the only one before the Court.
There undoubtedly are cases where obtaining the identity of a
suspect would be relevant to dispelling or confirming a suspicion. For
example, if a woman calls the police to say: "There is a man lurking in
the bushes near my apartment. I'm afraid it's my ex-boyfriend, Albert
Jones. I have a restraining order against him. I can't go out and look.
He might kill me." Under those circumstances, ascertaining the man's
name would be reasonably related to dispelling or confirming suspicion.
Similarly, if a man is lurking outside of a schoolyard, ascertaining the
man's name to check against sex offender lists would be reasonably
related to dispelling suspicion. In cases like the ones just hypothesized, I
am willing to assume arguendo that there would be no Fourth
Amendment objection to arresting someone for failure to respond to an
appropriately-explained request for identification.°
In this case, the reasonable suspicion was predicated upon an
alleged assault on a female. Having found Hiibel by the side of the road
and a young woman in the truck, one would have thought that the first
step would be to ascertain the well-being of the female, not the name of
the male. He could have observed the female to see if she had any
injuries. He could have asked her if she had been attacked, and if either
her affirmative response or the manner of her negative response led
Deputy Dove to believe that she had been assaulted, he could have
arrested her father. Had the officer done that, he would have learned that
young Mimi Hiibel had not been assaulted and the whole matter would
have been resolved."'
Proper police citizen interaction is important. A brief detention on
the basis of reasonable suspicion is an exception to the general rule of
probable cause that we approved in Terry v. Ohio.' 2 We have always
insisted, however, that the detention be no more intrusive than
8. Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2454.
9. Id. at 2460.
10. See infra part B of this opinion.
11. In fact, they were arguing about a boy that Mimi's father disapproved of her
seeing, and it was Mimi who had hit her father. Her father then asked her to pull over so
that they could cool off. See supra Part II of this article.
12. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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necessary. 3 Besides being counter-productive to ascertaining the well-
being of Mimi Hiibel, Officer Dove's demand for identification surely
intruded on Dudley Hiibel's sense of security, privacy, and personal
autonomy far more than any good that the deputy might have hoped to
attain.
B
Even if one were to assume that the Court were correct in
concluding that this was an appropriate case to require identification, it is
essential that the police be required to explain to the suspect why he must
give that identification. Otherwise, the right of one not under reasonable
suspicion to withhold identification, clearly established by this Court's
decision in Brown v. Texas,14 will be eviscerated. This right will be
eviscerated because a person not under reasonable suspicion who is
asked for identification will have to give it or risk arrest because,
unbeknownst to him, in his total innocence, the police had what
amounted to reasonable suspicion. 15
The case at bar is a case in point. Dudley Hiibel had no idea that an
apparently reliable citizen mistakenly thought he saw Hiibel assaulting
his daughter. Consequently, Hiibel had no idea why Deputy Dove
wanted his identification. Although Dove did mention the report of a
fight between Hiibel and his daughter at the outset of the interview, he
never explained that he was investigating it as an assault. Indeed, it was
apparent throughout the interview that Hiibel thought that the entire
encounter was about illegal parking.
The Court emphasizes that Deputy Dove repeatedly asked Hiibel for
identification and suggests that Hiibel taunted the officer by asking to be
arrested. The Court does not mention that Hiibel repeatedly asked the
deputy why he wanted his license. Deputy Dove was repeatedly non-
responsive or evasive in his answers. Once he even said simply
"because" in response to Hiibel's "why" question. Little children
frequently do that at play. One might have expected a more mature
response from an officer of the law, supposedly entrusted with guarding
our cherished freedoms.
In the future, when a policeman asks an innocent citizen for
identification, what is she to do? Brown clearly holds that she need not
identify herself. But Hiibel thought that also. Several times Hiibel told
the deputy that he believed that he was cooperating with him. Yet the
13. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
14. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
15. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 368 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Court upholds a conviction based on an unexplained request for
identification, with no indication at all why the identification was
needed. Can any of us confidently refuse a request for identification in
the future no matter how innocent we may be? Regrettably, I fear the
answer is "no."
C
Even if Deputy Dove did have the power to demand identification,
there is a disconnect between the Court's theory of the case and the
State's theory of the arrest. The Court clearly holds (as it must if it is to
remain true to Kolender v. Lawson)16 that no particular form of
identification (such as a driver's license) need be shown. It is enough
that the suspect simply tell the officer what his name is. Yet it is clear
that Hiibel was arrested because he did not show Deputy Dove any
identification.
The first time Deputy Dove asked Hiibel if he had any identification
on him, Hiibel said: "No. Why should I have an ID? ' 17 Had deputy
Dove simply said: "That's ok. Just tell me who you are," it is at least
plausible that the confrontation would not have escalated. Indeed, for all
we know Hiibel might have been prepared to go to jail because he
thought that he was going to be arrested for not having identification
with him.
The Court (I hope) is not holding that every American must carry an
identification card with him lest the police need it should he be in a
situation in which reasonable suspicion may arise. But, if the officer is
free to ask for ID, not tell the suspect that formal ID isn't necessary, and
then arrest the suspect for not identifying himself, the result is the same.
D
The conviction that we uphold today is predicated upon several
layers of erroneous assumptions. Obtaining Dudley Hiibel's identity was
not necessary or even helpful in assessing the accuracy of the reasonable
suspicion. Furthermore by not informing him of the crime being
investigated, he was deprived of the opportunity to intelligently decide
whether to be more forthcoming. Finally, Hiibel was never told
(probably because it wasn't true) that the police would be satisfied if he
would simply tell them who he was.
More than half a century ago, Justice Jackson, upon his return from
16. See id.
17. For a full record of their conversation, see supra Part II of this article.
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Nuremberg, criticized his colleagues for treating the rights under the
Fourth Amendment as second class rights. As he put it: "Among
deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population,
crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart.
Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective
weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government."' 8 We ignore that
lesson today. And, what is sadder, we ignore it in a case where the
Government's need to stretch the Constitution was at its absolute nadir.
I dissent.
IV. Ramifications of the Case
In deciding Hiibel, the Supreme Court made no reference to 9/11.
The Nevada Supreme Court in reaching the same conclusion, however,
was not so subtle. As that court put it:
Most importantly, we are at war against enemies who operate with
concealed identities and the dangers we face as a nation are
unparalleled. Terrorism is "changing the way we live and the way
we act and the way we think." During the recent past, this country
suffered the tragic deaths of more than 3,000 unsuspecting men,
women, and children at the hands of terrorists; seventeen innocent
people in six different states were randomly gunned down by snipers
and our citizens have suffered illness and death from exposure to
mail contaminated with Anthrax. We have also seen high school
students transport guns to school and randomly gun down their fellow
classmates and teachers. It cannot be stressed enough: "This is a
different kind of war that requires a different type of approach and a
different type of mentality." N9 To deny officers the ability to request
identification from suspicious persons creates a situation where an
officer could approach a wanted terrorist or sniper but be unable to
identify him or her if the person's behavior doesn't rise to the level of
probable cause necessary for an arrest.
20
Although a tad more subtle, the United States Supreme Court view
of the case is no less deadly to personal security. The Court, despite
saying that the request for identification must be reasonably related to the
stop, left little doubt there would never (or hardly ever) be a case
involving reasonable suspicion in which identification would not be
required. The Court even appeared to include all domestic disputes as
18. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
19. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 59 P. 3d 1201, 1206 (Nev. 2002), aff'd 124 S.Ct.
2451, 2458 (2004) (quoting President George W. Bush from an address he gave at a news
conference October 11, 2001).
20. Id.
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cases requiring identification, regardless of the circumstances. 2 1 Indeed,
the Court went so far as to say: "Obtaining a suspect's name in the
course of a Terry stop serves important government interests. 22 The
good news, I suppose, is that the Court said "a Terry stop," not "any
Terry stop." However, in light of the Hiibel facts, it is difficult to
imagine a case of reasonable suspicion in which identification would not
be required.
Furthermore, if the need for identification is as strong as the U.S.
and Nevada Supreme Courts suggest, why wouldn't there be a need for
reliable identification; a position specifically rejected by Kolender v.
Lawson?23 Suppose, for example, the police see a suspicious looking
person of apparent Middle Eastern descent carefully surveying a
shopping mall as if he is planning to blow it up. Assume that a
policeman stops him, frisks him and finds no weapons. They then enter
into the following dialogue:
Policeman: Could you identify yourself please?
Suspect: Yes, I'm Bill Jones
Policeman: May I see some identification please?
Suspect: No, I choose not to share that with you.
Does anybody truly believe that the suspect's negative response would
be the end of the encounter? Indeed, if Dudley Hiibel had simply said:
"My name is Dudley Hiibel," do we really believe that Deputy Dove
would have said: "Thank you very much" and left?
What is perhaps most disturbing about Hiibel, particularly from the
insights gained by watching the videotape of the incident,24 is that the
case is more about police power than it is about victim or community
safety. In that regard, it is first cousin to Atwater v. Lago Vista,25 a case
decided just a few months before 9/11. In that case, Bart Turek, a
policeman who pretended to be concerned with the safety of Atwater's
unbelted children, arrested their mother, denied her the opportunity to
21. See Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Ct., 124 S.Ct. 2451, 2458 (2004) (stating: "Officers
called to investigate domestic disputes need to know whom they are dealing with in order
to assess the situation, the threat to their own safety, and possible danger to the potential
victim.").
22. Id.
23. See 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (striking down ordinance that required persons to
provide "credible and reliable" identification to police on demand).
24. See Video Tape Transcript, supra note 5.
25. 532 U.S. 318 (2001). Cf Arnold H. Loewy, Cops, Cars, and Citizens: Fixing
the Broken Balance, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 535, 559-564 (2001).
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make arrangements for her children, and drove Atwater to the police
station in handcuffs and without fastening her seatbelt in the police car.
26
Similarly, in Hiibel, Lee Dove, supposedly concerned with the
safety of young Mimi Hiibel, arrested her father despite her protests to
stop. When Mimi exited the truck to try to assist her father, she was
thrown to the ground, face first, and handcuffed by one of deputy Dove's
colleagues. The panic that this caused her literally turned her into a
screaming Mimi. Meanwhile, her handcuffed father could do nothing
more than sarcastically refer to the bullying police as "Big men."
Despite the similarities of Atwater and Hiibel, there was one
substantial difference. Atwater came with an impressive historical
pedigree that was lacking in Hiibel. Indeed, the Atwater Court
recognized that it was performing an injustice on the facts of the case
before it. That Court believed, however, that the importance of a clear
rule allowing the police to arrest for a minor crime committed in their
presence was important enough to allow an injustice on the peculiar facts
of the case.
The procedure in Hiibel has no similar pedigree. Indeed, prior to
Terry27 in 1968, the police could stop somebody only on probable cause.
Each incremental intrusion since Terry has been grudgingly granted only
when necessity could be shown. 8 Consequently, stop and frisk cases
have classically been judged by standards as opposed to rules.29
Therefore, the Court should have taken seriously its admonition to ensure
that the request for identification is reasonably related to the
circumstances justifying the stop.
The Court did not do that in Hiibel. Instead, it decided that
identification is reasonably related to a Terry stop, and that in domestic
disputes, the identity of the suspect is important. Consequently, it did
not need to ask whether the special facts and circumstances of this case
rendered identity essential, or even helpful. If the Court had not been so
anxious to lay down a general rule in a case where one is not appropriate,
it might have come up with the correct result.
To what extent is Hiibel the product of 9/11? Obviously Atwater
preceded 9/11, so one cannot categorically say Hiibel wouldn't have
happened without the events of 9/11. But Atwater was historically
explicable, and both Brown v. Texas3 0 and Kolender v. Lawson 31 strongly
26. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 369 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
27. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
28. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
29. See generally Kathleen Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARV. L. REv. 22 (1992).
30. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
31. 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
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counsel against the Hiibel result. To the extent that 9/11 did give us
Hiibel, it seems trite but fair to say: "Chalk up one more win for the
terrorists."
V. Hiibel in His Own Words
I conclude this essay with an editorial by Dudley Hiibel from the
Los Angeles Times:
A lot of people want to know why I went all the way to the Supreme
Court rather than give my name to a policeman. "What's so
important about that?" they ask. "What's the big principle at stake?"
And last week, when the Supreme Court ruled against me, maybe
some thought I was foolish to have done it. But I still think I did the
right thing and that there were some issues that had to be decided.
The story began on May 21, 2000, when I was on a rural road near
my ranch in Winnemucca, Nev. My daughter and I had gotten into
an argument. She was driving, and I was the passenger. We stopped
by the side of the road, parked legally, and we continued our
argument. I figured we would finish it out and then cool off for a
moment.
That's when I heard sirens, and all of a sudden a police car drove up.
A deputy walked up to me and demanded my "papers." I asked him
what the problem was. "Why do you guys have me surrounded?" I
asked, because by now there were two or three more police cars. He
refused to explain why he was there or why he wanted my papers.
Eleven times he demanded my identification. I refused to give it to
him each time, and he finally handcuffed me and took me to jail. The
cops threw my daughter on the ground, cuffed her hands behind her
and demanded her name as well, but by that time I was on my way to
the county jail. I got there at midafternoon and stayed overnight.
I hadn't been argumentative; I wasn't picking a fight. Basically,
when Deputy Dove demanded my papers-and he didn't ask for
them, he demanded them-I didn't say, "Hey cop, I'm not going to
give you nothing." I just asked why he wanted them. "What have I
done?" I asked. If he'd explained what he was doing there, perhaps it
could have been settled on the spot. But his position was that he
wanted the papers first.
Here's why this was so important to me: I don't believe that the
authorities in the United States of America are supposed to walk up
to you and ask for your papers. I thought that wasn't lawful.
Apparently I was wrong, but I thought that that was part of what we
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were guaranteed under the Constitution. We're supposed to be free
men, able to walk freely in our own country-not hampered, not
stopped at checkpoints. That's part of what makes this country
different from other places. That's what I was taught.
And it's not just because it's in the Constitution. It's something that
you just kind of know. It's kind of obvious. If you haven't
committed a crime, you shouldn't be harassed by the police. If they
suspect you of something, I don't see why they shouldn't explain it. I
wasn't violent. And it was proven later in court that I hadn't
committed any crimes.
These days, it's like we're all guilty until proven innocent. You walk
into an airport and everybody's a suspect. Like the way people were
treated in Soviet Russia, in Red China, in Castro's Cuba.
We don't want the United States to become that.
I don't have a super-clear understanding of the Constitution. I'm not
an attorney. I've never even read the whole thing. I only went
through eighth grade. But I remember what I learned, and it seems to
me that the whole idea of "your-papers-please" goes completely
against the grain of the American people.
As I understood it, the state was supposed to serve us-not that we
were supposed to serve the state. Laws were supposed to protect the
people against the government, not the other way around.
Maybe in Los Angeles and other places across the country, the police
have browbeaten the people into more acceptance of this police state
mentality than where I am. I live out on a ranch, the nearest town is
30 miles away, and it only has 7,000 or 8,000 people. I think that has
an effect on our mentality.
It's not that I'm anti-law enforcement. Criminals should be
apprehended. But I don't think we've got to take everybody's rights
away just so that we can be safe. If you do that, you've defeated your
purpose. I don't think people want to be protected to the extent that
they become slaves.
I'm very disappointed by this decision. I think a basic freedom has
been lost. What bothers me the most is that my children and
grandchildren are going to have to live with this law. It moves us a
step closer to control of the people by the government, and I don't
[Vol. 109:4
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think that's a step forward.
32
Frankly, I believe that Dudley Hiibel's assessment of the law was
superior to that of the five Supreme Court justices that ruled against him.
It is sad commentary that a simple rancher/cowboy with an eighth grade
education understands the intricacies of the Constitution better than the
five elite lawyers that constituted a majority of the Supreme Court that
ruled against him. But then again, it may not be intricacies, but
simplicities, that Dudley Hiibel understands. Justice Jackson understood
them when he returned from Nuremberg. 33 One might hope that one day
the current Supreme Court would share that understanding. But frankly,
after the election of 2004, I'm afraid that day may be far off.
VI. Epilogue
Dudley Hiibel was not the only family member called to answer for
the incident on Grass Valley Road that fateful day. Mimi was also
charged. The alleged victim of her father's assault (and actual victim of
the policeman's assault) was charged with resisting arrest. Her father
asked one question in court: What charge was his daughter arrested for
resisting? Being unable to answer that question, the court dismissed the
charge.34
32. Larry Dudley Hiibel, Editorial, We All Lose If Cops Have All the Power, L.A.
TIMES, June 24, 2004, at B15.
33. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
34. See Official Website of Dudley Hiibel, at http://www.papersplease.org/
hiibel/facts.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2005).
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